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Why a World State Is Unnecessary:  
The Continuing Debate on World Government
W.  Ju l i a n  Kor a b -K a r p ow ic z
Lazarski University in Warsaw, Zayed University in Dubai
wjkk@lazarski.edu.pl
Abstract: The discussion of the possibility of world government has been revived since the 
end of the Cold War and particularly after the turn of the millennium. It has engaged many 
authors. In this article, I provide a survey of the continuing debate on world government. 
I explore the leading question of the debate, whether the conditions of insecurity in which 
states are placed and other global problems that face contemporary humanity require the 
creation of a global authority, and consequently, the establishment of a world state. After 
a careful analysis I suggest that a world state is neither necessary nor inevitable nor desir-
able. I argue that the plurality of nation-states that form an international society has a great 
advantage over a world state. It supports the diversity of character and culture, and sustains 
the continuous progress of humankind.
Where there are more states, there are more able men.
—Niccolò Machiavelli
The plurality of sovereign states is a disturbing puzzle for a political phi-
losopher. As individual human beings, we are members of different political 
communities and enjoy the security they can provide. Yet, since these com-
munities are organized as sovereign states that lack a common authority 
above them, at the same time we live in a sort of Hobbesian “state of nature”—
a condition that puts all states in a constant disposition to war. 
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This reflection about the conflicting character of our international 
environment can lead us to the conclusion that the solution of many world 
problems and, above all, of insecurity, can be provided only by bringing 
international anarchy to an end. We start to believe that “the predicament of 
vulnerability of nation-states calls for a global authority with sufficient power 
to redress or prevent attacks on themselves.”1 We come to think that “like the 
United Nations itself, global governance is a bridge between the old and the 
as yet unborn…a world federal government, an idea that is both necessary 
and possible.”2 We become convinced that a world state is “inevitable”3 and 
“democratically necessary.”4 Thus, we come to the conclusion that “whether 
by a social contract among the nations or by conquest, whether gradually 
or at once, whether by a frontal assault on national sovereignty or a silent 
undermining of its foundations,”5 the anarchic system of sovereign states is 
to be finally replaced by a universal world state. 
In this article, I provide a survey of the continuing debate on world 
government.6 I explore the leading question of the debate: whether the condi-
tions of insecurity in which states are placed, and other global problems that 
face contemporary humanity, require the creation of a global authority and 
consequently, the establishment of a world state. Discussing the views of such 
authors as Campbell Creig, Daniel Deudney, Luis Cabrera, Thomas Magnell, 
and Alexander Wendt, I come to the conclusion that a world state is neither 
necessary nor inevitable, nor even desirable, at least at this stage of human 
development. I argue that the plurality of nation-states that form an inter-
national society has a considerable advantage over a world state. It supports 
the diversity of character and culture and sustains the continuous progress 
of humankind. 
1  Thomas Magnell, “Vulnerability, Global Authority, and Moving Away from a Local Maximum of 
Value,” Journal of Value Inquiry 36, no. 1 (2002): 5.
2  Thomas G. Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government,” International Studies  
Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2009): 265–66.
3  Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, 
no. 4 (2003): 491–542.
4  Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Democratically Necessary” (paper presented at Hiram  
College, February 28, 2014), available at  
http://wgresearch.org/why-a-world-state-is-democratically-necessary/.
5  Hedley Bull, “Society and Anarchy in International Relations,” in International Theory: Critical 
Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 76.
6  Research reported in this article was supported by the Research Incentive Fund of Zayed University 
under award number R15088.
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A World State and the Domestic Analogy
The argument that to save the world from war and provide peace and security, 
it is necessary to employ a kind of social contract transferring sovereignty of 
individual states to a global authority rests on an analogy with domestic societ-
ies.7 Relations among states in the anarchic international system are compared 
to those among individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature. The conditions of 
an orderly social life are believed to be the same among states as among indi-
viduals; thus they require that domestic institutions be reproduced on a global 
scale. It was indeed Thomas Hobbes who identified the absence of a ruler, 
literally an-archy, with the state of conflict and argued that without a cen-
tral authority with sufficient power to keep humans in awe, the war “of every 
man against every man” would be the universal condition of humankind.8 
If we accept his assumptions, particularly the conflictual and power-driven 
character of human beings, then, on the basis of the analogy between indi-
vidual persons and individual states, it would be logical to conclude that peace 
among nations could be secured only by ending the “anarchy” and establish-
ing a universal world state comprising all nations of the earth. 
Although a world state would find support in writings of many intellectu-
als, especially those of the early post–World War II period, who thought that 
it would spare humanity from a nuclear threat, this is not a position taken by 
Hobbes himself. He does not propose that a social contract between nations 
be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end. This is because, as 
Hedley Bull notes, the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does 
not necessarily lead to insecurity for individuals.9 As long as an armed con-
flict between countries, whether involving nuclear or conventional weapons, 
does not actually break out, individuals living within them can feel relatively 
secure. After comparing sovereign states to gladiators prepared for combat, 
Hobbes goes on to say that “because they uphold thereby the industry of their 
subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the 
misery of individual men.”10 In other words, although states may regard each 
other with suspicion and be ready for war, the lives of the people who live in 
them are not necessarily “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”11
7  See Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 80.
8  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. E. Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), chap. 13 [9].
9  Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 87.
10  Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 12 [8].
11  Ibid., chap. 13 [12].
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Three Paradigms of International Relations
Political philosophy offers two standard paradigms of international rela-
tions. On one hand, in the tradition of realism associated with Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, sovereign states are in the anarchic state of nature, unrestrained 
by legal or moral rules in their relations with one another.12 Viewed from this 
perspective, the international environment is characterized by lawlessness 
and ongoing active or passive conflict.13 Placed in a situation of anarchy, with 
no ruler above them, states are caught in a continuous struggle for power 
and survival. On the other hand, in counterpoint to this tradition, a reflec-
tion on the conflictual character of interstate relations can also lead us to the 
conclusion that peace among nations should be secured by bringing interna-
tional anarchy to an end. Thus, in a second paradigm, whose elements can be 
traced to ancient Chinese and Indian as well as Greco-Roman thought,14 and 
which was clearly expressed as early as the mid-thirteenth century by Dante 
Alighieri in his De Monarchia, states can escape the conditions of anarchy 
by being subject to the despotism or overarching authority of a universal 
empire.15 Advocates of this solution to the problem of interstate insecurity 
attempt a radical transformation of the existing international system. They 
believe that what is needed to ensure lasting peace is the transfer of the sov-
ereignty of individual nation-states to a central authority, one that would 
be sovereign over individual nations in the same way that such nations are 
sovereign over their respective territories. Under the ensuing world govern-
ment, all humankind would then be united. 
12  My discussion of three paradigms is indebted to Hedley Bull’s “Society and Anarchy in Interna-
tional Relations” and his three doctrines of international relations: the first describing them in terms 
of a Hobbesian state of nature; the second, of which Kant is a representative, which brings interna-
tional anarchy to an end; and the third based on the conception of international society (78–79). Bull 
follows the distinction drawn by Martin Wight between realism (or Machiavellism), rationalism (or 
Grotianism), and revolutionism (or Kantianism) (Robert Jackson, “The Political Theory of Interna-
tional Society,” in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith [Cambridge: 
Polity, 1995], 114). However, in my view, at least in Perpetual Peace, Kant is clearly a supporter of 
international society rather than of world society, and thus he belongs to rationalism and to my third 
paradigm together with Grotius.
13  In realism, the conflict-oriented paradigm of international relations, the key actors are 
states, power and security are the main issues, and there is little place for morality (W. Julian 
Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Summer 2017 ed., ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/
realism-intl-relations/).
14  Derek Heater, World Citizenship and World Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of 
Western Political Thought (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996).
15  “By the temporal government of the world or universal empire, we mean a single government over 
all peoples in time” (Dante Alighieri, On World-Government or De Monarchia, trans. H. W. Schneider 
[Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949], 4).
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There is, however, another paradigm that is often overlooked or even 
misunderstood by many of today’s writers who discuss the question of world 
government.16 It is an alternative to both lawlessness and despotism, and is 
offered in the writings of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, both of whom 
can in my view be associated with international society. 
To begin with the former, in his great treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On 
the Law of War and Peace), first published in 1625, Grotius neither approves 
of lawlessness in interstate relations nor is attracted by the idea of replacing 
individual sovereign states with a universal empire, about which he says that 
its “advantages are counterbalanced by still greater disadvantages.”17 Instead, 
he proposes the third paradigm: international society, according to which 
states in their dealings with one another are linked by mutual obligations, 
and thus form a society with one another, “a society without a government.”18 
Grotius’s assumption, like that of Hedley Bull and other theorists of the Eng-
lish school,19 is that sovereign states, like individuals, can be subject to legal 
rules and, by sharing some common norms and values, they can recognize 
the common bonds of their society. This does not mean that they lose their 
sovereignty, which can still be preserved even when they voluntarily choose 
to become members of international organizations.20 Also, this does not 
mean that they free themselves from the demands of power politics and 
16  Because of this misunderstanding, Hugo Grotius is sometimes associated with the idea of world 
government rather than with that of international society (see Campbell Craig, “The Resurgent Idea 
of World Government,” Ethics and International Affairs 22, no. 2 [2008]: 133–42), whereas Immanuel 
Kant is associated with a cosmopolitan world society and the belief in human progress (Bull, “Society 
and Anarchy,” 79).
17  Hugo Grotius, De Juri Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), trans. F. W. Kelsey (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1925), II.22.xiii.
18  Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 89–90. In addition, a fourth paradigm of international relations can 
be mentioned. It is idealism, a theoretical perspective that has many similarities with the interna-
tional-society approach and emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and 
international cooperation.
19  The English school (international-society approach), founded in the mid-twentieth century by 
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, emphasizes both systemic and normative constraints on the behavior 
of states. Referring to the classical view of the human being as an individual that is basically social and 
rational, capable of cooperating and learning from past experiences, these theorists emphasize that 
states, like individuals, have legitimate interests that others can recognize and respect, and that they 
can recognize the general advantages of observing a principle of reciprocity in their mutual rela-
tions (Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, eds., Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 167).
20  Robert Jackson emphasizes that international society involves mutual obligations between states, 
and “the degree of society can be conceived as a continuum, from mere awareness and very limited 
contact, at one extreme, to extensive and continuous interaction through a highly developed institu-
tional framework” (Jackson, “Political Theory of International Society,” 111).
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great-powers rule. As Bull notes, the society that they form can be under-
stood in terms of its unique institutions: “international law, diplomacy and 
the system of balance of power.”21 Moreover, in subjecting international rela-
tions to the rule of law, Grotius does not maintain that this is true only with 
respect to a certain class of states, such as the Western or “civilized” states. He 
regards the formal equality of all states as a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law. In his Mare Liberum, he regards Asian rulers as sovereigns capable 
of entering into diplomatic and treaty relations with European powers.22 
Arguing against the dominant imperialist theories of his time, he denies that 
some peoples can be subjected to conquest because of their religion or their 
alleged cultural and intellectual inferiority. Since he grounds international 
rules in natural law, his international society is global and all-inclusive in its 
scope. It is applicable to all nations. The practical expression of the Grotian 
global order, which is based on the rule of law in international relations, is the 
United Nations Organization, whose member states are equal before the law 
and preserve their sovereignty; it is not a world state. 
An argument against a world state is also offered by Immanuel Kant. 
While arguing against the views of those of his contemporaries who wanted 
to eradicate nations and promote internationalism, Kant, in his 1795 essay 
Perpetual Peace, says that the existence of many separate states is “ratio-
nally preferable to their being overrun by a superior power that melts them 
into a universal monarchy.”23 As “laws invariably lose their impact with the 
extension of the domain of governance,”24 Kant apparently fears that upon 
the transformation of the existing international system based on individual 
states into a world state, the latter would be unable to keep dissenting groups 
within the bounds of law. Since nature has prevented people from intermin-
gling with each other by differences in language and religion, he suggests, 
they cannot be artificially united by a supranational structure imposed from 
above. Hence, unable to attract common loyalties and turning into a “soulless 
despotism,” which maintains peace solely by force, a world state would lead 
to endemic secessionist conflict, and would finally collapse and disintegrate 
into anarchy. It is not then a world state, but a league of nations, which is a 
“federation of nations, but it must be a state consisting of nations,” as well 
21  Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 90.
22  W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, On the History of Political Philosophy: Great Political Thinkers from 
Thucydides to Locke (New York: Routledge, 2016), 156.
23  Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. T. Humphrey  
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 125.
24  Ibid.
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as “the growth of culture and men’s gradual progress toward greater agree-
ment regarding their principles,” that can lead human beings to mutual 
understanding and peace.25 As the father of democratic-peace theory, Kant 
convincingly argues that a peaceful world order is guaranteed by liberal 
republics, which, when established and brought together to form a league 
of peace (foedus pacificum), will progressively lead to cooperative relations 
among themselves “to end all wars forever.”26 Another element in building 
peace is cosmopolitan right—the right of an alien not to be treated as an 
enemy—which is reinforced by the spirit of trade. Hence, in Kant’s view, the 
negative effects of international anarchy can be tamed not by the installa-
tion of a world government, but by the development of a global cosmopolitan 
culture and by the relations among states of a similarly liberal character that 
are joined into a federation of free states, which is the league of peace. As he 
asserts in his earlier work Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan 
(1784), the development of a global culture may eventually lead humankind 
to the perfect civic union.27 However, such a union, even if we assume that it 
is no longer a federal league of nations or a global cultural association, but a 
world state, is the result of long-term natural growth, of progressive human 
moral and intellectual evolution, rather than of any artificial imposition here 
and now. 
Postwar Support for and Opposition to World Government
The idea of a global authority was strongly advocated during the late 1940s, 
from roughly 1944 to 1950. Under the impact of the Second World War, 
prospects for a third, and continuing international tensions stimulated by 
ideological differences between the United States and the USSR, the pro-
paganda for a world state reached large audiences and imparted to them 
a sense of urgency.28 Many intellectuals called for the establishment of an 
25  Ibid., 115, 125.
26  Ibid., 117.
27  Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, in Toward Perpetual Peace 
and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History, trans. D. L. Colclasure (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 14. Kant’s ideas about cosmopolitanism have led some scholars to believe that 
whatever reservations Kant had about world government, his ideas related to human progress and 
the cosmopolitan world society lead him in the direction of an eventual world state in the form of the 
perfect civil union. This could be the reason why both Wight and Bull have attributed to Kant a dif-
ferent theoretical perspective from that of Grotius. However, as Howard Williams rightly points out, 
for Kant the idea of a world government is not to be implemented here and now, but “only after a long 
process of political and legal integration through federation” (Williams, Kant and the End of War: A 
Critique of Just War Theory [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012], xi). 
28  H. C. Usborne, Towards World Government: The Role of Britain, Peace Aims Pamphlet 39 (London: 
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overarching global authority capable of sparing humanity from a nuclear 
war. These included Nobel-laureate novelist Thomas Mann, Albert Camus, 
and Jean-Paul Sartre, who were supported by thousands of street demonstra-
tors.29 Most notably, Albert Einstein and his colleagues from the Emergency 
Committee of Atomic Scientists lobbied for world government and global 
control of nuclear weapons.30 Numerous resolutions were also introduced 
into the US Congress that would support the creation of a world federation 
or the transformation of the United Nations along world government lines. 
However, these initiatives faded quickly with the intensification of the Cold 
War. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 replaced the dream for a universal 
republic with suspicion and fear. Although the world government was still 
advocated by some scholars, for example by Bertrand Russell, who supported 
it in his 1959 book Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, it would lose its 
importance in IR theory. It is often observed that two prominent political 
realists of that era, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, entertained the 
idea of a world state; however, it is less commonly noted that they were both 
aware of and critical of its weaknesses. 
In “The Illusion of World Government,” published in 1949 in Foreign 
Affairs, Niebuhr summarized what he deemed to be the fallacy of world 
government. His argument refers to the domestic analogy and resembles 
the Kantian critique. The advocates of world government, Niebuhr claims, 
labor under a misconception about the nature of governmental authority. The 
notion of the social contract led them to believe that authority rests on the 
government’s monopoly of law and lawful force. They base their advocacy of 
world government on the analogy of the social contract, by which individuals 
living in a Hobbesian state of nature, where there is no ruler and no one is 
secure, surrender their individual sovereignty to an authority in exchange 
for security and protection. However, as Niebuhr suggests, Hobbes’s ideas 
are fundamentally mistaken. The “authority of government is not primar-
ily the authority of law nor the authority of force [as Hobbes believes], but 
the authority of community itself. Laws are obeyed because the community 
National Peace Council, 1946); Crane Brinton, From Many One: The Process of Political Integration and 
the Problem of World Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); Hans J. Morgen-
thau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1956).
29  Luis Cabrera, “World Government: Renewed Debate, Persistent Challenges,” European Journal of 
International Relations 16, no. 3 (2010): 512.
30  Albert Einstein, “The Way Out” (1946), in One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full 
Meaning of the Atomic Bomb, ed. D. Masters and K. Way (New York: New Press, 2007), 209–14.
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accepts them as corresponding, on the whole, to its conception of justice.”31 
Thus, Hobbes’s belief in the desire for power as a motivating force of human 
action has led him and his realist followers to an unqualified endorsement of 
coercive state power. But this is because, Niebuhr thinks, they were not real-
istic enough. In the world of pure realism, in which, as the realist E. H. Carr 
asserts, even values are made relative to interests, “life turns into nothing 
more than a power game and is unbearable.”32 What Hobbes did not under-
stand when formulating a realist worldview based on the idea of power and 
coercion was that although the government is indispensable for maintenance 
of domestic peace, it cannot rely on power alone. To inspire obedience by 
the fear of sanctions is not enough; the government also needs the citizens’ 
willing identification with its policies. This is, according to Niebuhr, the 
greatest omission in Hobbesian political philosophy. Analogously, without 
commanding the willing obedience of individuals, a world state, created by 
social contract, whereby individual nations transfer their powers and relin-
quish significant elements of their sovereignty to a central authority, cannot 
perform its task of maintaining global peace.
A similar objection is made by Hans Morgenthau, best known for his 
book Politics among Nations, first published in 1948, when the Cold War 
had just started. The argument for world government, he claims, which rests 
on the domestic analogy, involves two premises. First, world government 
will provide security. Second, security is the primary need of individuals 
and states, so their liberty should, if necessary, be sacrificed to it. However, 
Morgenthau believes that neither the first nor the second premise is true. 
In the chapter of his book devoted to a world state, he writes: “The peace 
of society whose intergroup conflicts are no longer limited, restrained, and 
neutralized by overriding loyalties, [and] whose processes of social change 
no longer sustain expectations of justice in all the major groups…cannot be 
saved by the state, however strong.”33 Hence, to begin with the first premise, 
for any state, including a world state, Morgenthau argues, keeping individu-
als in awe by overwhelming force is an essential, but not sufficient condition 
for peace and an orderly social life. To remain in peace, individuals must be 
able to expect from society at least an approximation of their conception of 
what is just and proper. They must also feel loyalties to society as a whole, as 
31  H. W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 191.
32  Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations.”
33  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 476.
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a political and cultural group, that would surpass their loyalties to any one 
part of it. Without these loyalties and identities related to them, the power 
of an authority, “as great as it would be,” is alone not sufficient to keep peace 
and this is proved by the experience of civil wars.34 In the research of Quincy 
Wright, to which Morgenthau refers, it is shown that between 1480 and 1941, 
28 percent of the total 278 wars were civil wars.35 They were costlier in both 
losses of lives and economic losses than contemporary international wars. 
The frequency and destructiveness of such civil wars demonstrate that, as 
long as humanity does not share fundamental common values and is cultur-
ally divided, the establishment of a world state does not give any assurance of 
security and peace. 
Both Niebuhr and Morgenthau try to demonstrate that the state is not 
merely an artificial creation of a constitutional convention, or a mere result 
of its controlling power on the legitimate means of violence, but a diverse 
product of a community from which it springs. As Morgenthau convincingly 
argues, what is missing from the theory of world state formation is thus an 
account of people’s loyalties and identities. It assumes that individuals are 
merely rational, self-interested utility maximizers. It does not take into con-
sideration that their cultural (particularly religious and ethnic) identities, 
when suppressed, can lead to conflicts. The forces of destruction in the form 
of class, racial, religious, regional, or purely political struggles erupt in revo-
lutions and civil wars.36 This shows that the second premise is also not true. 
Motivated by vital issues, individuals and nations can enter into conflict and 
forsake their security. Hence, as the cases of the partition of India in 1947, 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the ongoing conflicts in the 
Middle East show, the existence of a plurality of sovereign states may often be 
less dangerous than an attempt to hold potentially hostile religious and eth-
nic groups within the framework of a single state. If we believe that a world 
state should be implemented in order to save us from nuclear and terrorist 
threats37 and to solve some urgent transnational problems, such as climate 
34  Morgenthau links loyalties to identities. According to him a citizen can identify with a plurality of 
different social groupings (political, economic, religious, ethnic) within society, and is therefore not 
fully identified with any of them and does not give any of them his undivided loyalty. The overlapping 
of identities of different members of society tend to neutralize their conflicts. Thus, to maintain social 
peace citizens, in spite of their differences, must have something in common. They must be united by 
some common values and interests, or as Morgenthau says, by moral standards and political action 
(ibid., 470–71, 489).
35  Ibid., 476.
36  Ibid., 476–77.
37  Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New 
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change, migration, financial instability, and pandemics, which require action 
at a global level,38 to obtain success we need first to create a supportive world 
community sharing common values and guided by the same vision. Morgen-
thau himself feared that without the moral support of a world community, a 
world state would be “a totalitarian monster resting on feet of clay” and torn 
apart by revolutions and civil wars.39
For Morgenthau, the value of UNESCO and other agencies of the United 
Nations lay not in themselves, but in what he believed to be their final cause, 
a world state. He saw in them a means to create a world community, which he 
defined as “a community of moral standards and political action,”40 which he 
realistically thought was necessary to sustain a world state. Like Niebuhr, he 
did not question the analogy with domestic societies on which the argument 
for a world state rested but denied that any state that was expected to endure 
could be created artificially by way of a social contract. He believed that just 
as the community of the American people antedated the American state, so 
also a world community of the people sharing the same moral and political 
values must antedate a world state. 
However, if it is the case, as Morgenthau believed, that through the work 
of international organizations, common global values can be introduced and 
the interests of all nations gradually integrated, then the domestic analogy on 
which he bases his argument no longer holds. Anarchy, which is the central 
fact of international relations, cannot then be identified with the imaginary 
Hobbesian state of nature,41 which is the state of war. It can then be peaceful 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Louis Pojman, Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World 
Government (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Daniel H. Deudney, Bounding Power: 
Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); Craig, “Resurgent Idea of World Government”; William E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case 
for Global Reform (Oxford: Polity, 2011).
38  Furio Cerutti, Global Challenges for Leviathan: A Political Philosophy of Nuclear Weapons and 
Global Warming (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007); Weiss, “Idea of World Government”; 
Gary Stix, “Effective World Government Will Be Needed to Stave Off Climate Catastrophe,” Sci-
entific American, March 17, 2012, http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2012/03/17/
effective-world-government-will-still-be-needed-to-stave-off-climate-catastrophe/.
39  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 482.
40  Ibid., 489.
41  The Hobbesian state of nature can be described as imaginary because it is a theoretical concept 
used to justify Hobbes’s political theory. The real question is whether it has never existed. Violence 
exists in plenty in pre-state, primitive societies, but it is largely intergroup rather than intragroup, 
and thus a precursor to war between states rather than a war of all against all. Modeling international 
relations on a dystopia that only ever existed in the imaginations of thinkers seems the exact opposite 
of a true political realism. When we observe actual stateless societies, their problem is not incessant 
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and tolerable to a degree to which anarchy among individual human beings 
is not. This is the fundamental claim of the thinkers representing the English 
school: there can exist in anarchy a society of sovereign states, “a society with-
out a government.”42 Consequently, as there is no simple similarity between 
nation-states and individuals concerning their security, there may be no need 
to bring international anarchy to an end by establishing a world government. 
The real alternative to Hobbesian anarchy, where no one is secure, is thus 
not a potentially unstable and despotic world state, but a strong international 
society, based on the UN.
It was indeed the accomplishment of Hedley Bull and of other members 
of the English school to show that international anarchy was unique and 
could not be compared with Hobbesian anarchy.43 As an alternative to both 
sovereign states, unrestrained by any rules in their relations with others, and 
a world state, in the third paradigm of international relations, which is inter-
national society, states could be linked to one another by mutual obligations. 
They can thus form a great society of nations, the fullest practical expression 
of which is today the United Nations, which is an organization of free, sover-
eign states and not a world state. Further, the UN need not be seen merely as 
a step toward a world government, as Morgenthau envisioned, but instead as 
the final and proper organizational body of the international system. It can 
be looked at as the Kantian league of peace, a voluntary federation of states, 
designed to progressively put an end to all wars. Since we are now living 
within a more sophisticated global environment than that which obtained at 
the time of the UN’s founding, the activities of the UN can be supported by 
the work of other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, 
and by formal and informal agreements among states and various public-
private partnerships. They all can contribute to building global governance, 
which, however, needs to be clearly distinguished from world government. 
“‘Global governance’ refers to collective efforts to identify, understand, or 
address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual 
states to solve.”44 World government eradicates state sovereignty, whereas dif-
ferent models of global governance can preserve this sovereignty and engage 
conflict but excessive conformity; in the absence of an external authority, the tyranny of the majority 
(and of tradition) goes unchecked (Korab-Karpowicz, History of Political Philosophy, 158–83).
42  See Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 89–90.
43  Recent years have brought a revival of interest in Hedley Bull and the English School. For an 
extensive biography of the English school provided by Bary Buzan, see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/
englishschool/. 
44  Weiss, “Idea of World Government,” 257.
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states and nonstate entities in cooperation to maintain international peace 
and security, and to solve global problems. 
New Trends towards World Government 
The discussion of the possibility of world government has been revived since 
the end of the Cold War and particularly after the turn of the millennium. 
It is distinct in character from the debate of the 1940s. The prominent advo-
cates of global authority were then scientists and authors whose core field 
often lay outside the realm of international relations, but who were driven by 
a sense of urgency to argue that the nuclear threat must be controlled, and 
who were supported by large numbers of ordinary citizens. Today’s discus-
sion is more dispassionate and is a product primarily of social scientists. It 
is also more systematic in its approach and more sophisticated in its argu-
ment.45 The issues discussed range from the traditional issues of security to 
global poverty, economic integration, environmental issues, and core social, 
political, and economic rights. Some authors express optimistic beliefs 
about world government.46 They tend to think that technological advances 
will further shrink the globe to the extent that within one hundred years 
or so, all states should recognize a single global authority. They believe that 
the political center of gravity will move upwards. National governments 
will not disappear altogether, but “their powers would be severely circum-
scribed by supranational legislative, executive and judicial authorities.”47 The 
model for this transition to a comprehensive global authority is for many 
writers the European Union, which advances intergovernmental economic 
agreements, including a single currency, and continues to expand its global 
political role.48 As their critics have observed, such writers frequently regard 
the European Union “as if it were an utterly unproblematic model for the 
world.”49 The recent decision of the UK to leave the EU may serve, however, 
45  Cabrera, “World Government,” 525.
46  Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will Economic Integration Go?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 
1 (2000): 177–86; Magnell, “Vulnerability, Global Authority”; Craig, “Resurgent Idea of World Gov-
ernment”; Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable”; Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders: A Global 
Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Deudney, Bounding Power; Cabrera, “World 
Government”; Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform; Robert E. Goodin, “World Government 
Is Here!,” in Varieties of Sovereignty and Citizenship, ed. Sigal R. Ben-Porath and Rogers M. Smith 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 149–65; Wendt, “Why a World State Is Demo-
cratically Necessary.”
47  Rodrik, “How Far Will Economic Integration Go?,” 182.
48  Kenneth Rogoff, Why Not a Global Currency?,” American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001): 243–47.
49  Timothy Burns, “What’s Wrong with a World State,” in Sojourns in the Western Twilight: Essays in 
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as a warning that there are limits to integration imposed by bureaucratic 
regulations. Another model is the United States. Some commentators sug-
gest that a new world order is already emerging under the US hegemony.50 
I shall now critically examine arguments for world government offered by a 
few contemporary authors. 
During the Cold War the potential for mutual assured destruction by 
the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union placed the 
world under a much graver threat than today’s risks of terrorist attacks. The 
logic of that threat, however, shaped by the worldview of modernity,51 was 
rational and predictable. Both superpowers played the nuclear game in strict 
adherence to diplomatic conduct and the rules of deterrence. The terror-
ist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed this security environment. 
They provided a model for security threats for the twenty-first century. As 
the terrorists were prepared to die for their cause and did not express any 
concerns about the death of civilians, who were in fact their main target, the 
age of predictability, deterrence, and diplomacy was over. Hence, the cur-
rent age of globalization and postmodernity has witnessed the emergence of 
nonstate actors who are deterrent-proof.52 The terrorist groups no longer fol-
low the modernist, rationalist logic, and their irrational behavior affects the 
behavior of states. This has led some writers, in particular Thomas Magnell 
and Daniel Deudney, to conclude that in this unpredictable environment we 
are now subject to “equality or near equality of vulnerability” and that “new 
technologies of violence have rendered all persons potentially vulnerable to 
destruction.”53 To overcome this dangerous environment, Magnell argues 
that the United States, the relatively successful melting pot of nations, could 
serve as the paradigm for a world state, which can be created “here and now” 
Honor of Tom Darby, ed. Robert Sibley and Janice Freamo (Ottawa: Fermentation, 2016), 179–92.
50  Etzioni, From Empire to Community; Joseph P. Baratta, “The Inaugural Conference of the Post-
Cold-War Movement for World Government,” The Federalist Debate 29, no. 3 (2016): 24–26.
51  Modernity is typically defined as a historical period beginning around the seventeenth century. It 
is also a period during which the West, through scientific and technological advances, has achieved an 
unprecedented domination over the rest of the world. More importantly, however, modernity signifies 
a set of ideas and attitudes towards the world. It is an ideological formation that can be characterized 
by several concepts. Its defining ideas include rationality, national unity, and state sovereignty. Today 
we live already in the postmodern environment, in which rationality, national unity, and state sover-
eignty have all been eroded and whose key characteristics are cultural relativism and globalization.
52  Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Contemporary Security Challenges: Is Classical Deterrence an Adequate 
Response?,” in International Security Today: Understanding Change and Debating Strategy, ed. Mustafa 
Aydin and Kostas Ifantis, SAM Papers no. 1 (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2006), 205–24.
53  Magnell, “Vulnerability, Global Authority,” 4–5; Deudney, Bounding Power, 28.
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in the form of a global federation.54 Deudney suggests, then, that world gov-
ernment would not represent a radical change of the international system but 
would rather be a long-expected result of the steady movement toward the 
continual abridgement of anarchy. Unified by a common interest in avoiding 
nuclear annihilation and other threats, states can come together in much the 
same way tribes have in the past.55 
However, the positions outlined above are difficult to defend. The history 
of state formation is not the history of warring groups with different cultures 
coming together under a larger entity, but rather the history of cultural impo-
sition.56 One of the warring groups would acquire domination over the rest by 
war and impose its culture or civilization on them. Historically, empires were 
thus the result of political, economic, and cultural domination, not merely of 
military conquests. Another possibility of state formation is that culturally 
similar people would come together to form a state because of some com-
mon interest, for example in security and defense. As Morgenthau argues 
in Politics among Nations, giving the United States as an example, any state 
that is expected to endure must be founded on common values and common 
interests.57 The individual states that united in the federation that became the 
United States of America were sovereign in name rather than in actuality. 
By declaring their independence from Britain in 1776 and then establishing 
the United States, they merely exchanged one sovereign power for another. 
More importantly, however, they were bound by the same language, the 
same religion, the same national heritage, and the same moral convictions 
that were tested during the American War of Independence.58 Reflection 
on these historical facts reveals that “there can be no world state without 
a world community willing and able to support it”59 and at the global level 
54  Magnell, “Vulnerability, Global Authority,” 6.
55  Craig, “Resurgent Idea of World Government,” 138.
56  John M. Headley, The Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and Democ-
racy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
57  “The United States proves only the dependence upon a pre-existing moral and political community 
of any state that can be expected to endure.…The community of the American people antedated the 
American state, as a world community must antedate a world state” (Politics among Nations, 484–85).
58  As John Jay wrote in the Federalist, No. 2, Providence gave the United States “to one united people; 
a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same 
religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, 
and who by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody 
war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence” (The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton 
Rossiter [New York: Penguin Random House, 2003], 32).
59  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 481.
 3 9 4  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n      Volume 44 / Issue 3
such a community of similar cultural values currently does not exist. Even if 
united by popular culture and linked by processes of globalization, humanity 
is divided as ever by immense religious, moral, and economic differences. 
Therefore, it is impossible to peacefully transform the present anarchic inter-
national system into a world state under the social and political conditions 
now prevailing in the world. As if in anticipation of this impossibility, Deud-
ney concludes his investigation with an admission that the “actual launch 
of a world state could require a cataclysmic war of the kind that led to the 
formation of the League of Nations after World War I, and the formation 
of the United Nations after World War II.”60 But if another world war with 
unimaginable catastrophic consequences would impose a world state on an 
otherwise unwilling humanity, it would not be a long-lasting enterprise. It 
would not protect us from further violent conflicts.
While David Deudney and Thomas Magnell argue that establishing 
world government is a result of prudential choice and is necessary because the 
world has become too unpredictable and too dangerous, Alexander Wendt 
adopts a different argumentative strategy. Employing the teleological model 
of explanation and the Hegelian concept of the struggle for recognition which 
takes place among individuals and groups, and referring to advancements in 
technology, he argues that “with these material [or technological] changes the 
struggle for recognition among states undermines their self-sufficiency and 
makes a world state inevitable.”61 He compares the international system to 
a plant, which grows to its end-state, and he associates this end-state with a 
world state. He argues that in times of globalization weaker states will face 
a choice between subjugation to powerful states and globalized economic 
forces, on one hand, and participation in a world government, on the other. 
The logic of globalization, Wendt believes, would drive them to a world 
state, which should permit their local cultures and traditions to flourish.62 
However, since he admits that a world state contains within itself sources 
of instability and does not need to survive forever, he opens his own argu-
ment to doubt. He suggests that the struggle for recognition, an open-ended 
struggle involving individuals, groups, and communities, would not cease 
within the structure of a world state. Such a state would then be unable to 
solve the fundamental problem of human conflict and violence. It can indeed 
employ social engineering and powerful means of coercion, but, as Wendt 
60  Cabrera, “World Government,” 519.
61  Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” 494.
62  Ibid., 507–10.
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himself observes, such means have not prevented earlier empires, such as the 
Soviet Union, from breaking down.
Another argument in favor of world government is that it can ensure 
popular control over decision making, and thus promote global democracy. 
The processes of globalization that weaken the nation-state lead to a democ-
racy deficit. Individuals are affected by decisions of global institutions, such 
as WTO and IMF, over which they have no control. To solve the problem, 
and to provide citizen participation at a global level, some writers propose to 
institute a world parliament, while others go further, arguing for a federalist 
world state.63 The question is whether a democratic global majority rule could 
enhance the autonomy of minorities and whether this global democracy 
project would not in the end turn self-defeating. 
As a solution Luis Cabrera proposes “an alternative, rights-based 
approach” to global democracy.64 He identifies the idea of democracy with 
democratic inclusion and stresses the importance of global equal opportu-
nities, including much freer movement of persons in an integrated world 
system. In the postmodernist fashion, he puts less emphasis on national loy-
alties and identities and more to individual rights understood in a novel way 
as the rights of the “other.” The postmodernists seek the revenge of the mar-
ginalized “other” against the Lockean rational individual and regard human 
rights as the expression of neither universal truth nor objective reality but 
only as arbitrary social constructs and “moves in a game the subject enters 
when formulating his/her relationship to power in the language of funda-
mental rights.”65 But should we agree to understand individual rights that 
way and include among them the right to freely cross state borders? What we 
can currently observe is the turbulence that uncontrolled flow of migrants 
representing different religious and moral values has already caused in 
Europe. Should we then not learn from this, and rather than considering 
63  World parliament: Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament,” Foreign Affairs 
80, no. 1 (2001): 212–20; Rasmus Tenbergen, “Towards a World Parliament: A Summary of the Debate 
and a Proposal for an Electronic World Parliament,” July 2006, http://www.alliance21.org/2003/IMG/
pdf_worldparliament_1_.pdf. World state: Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against 
(London: Routledge, 2008); Ronald Tinnevelt, “Federal World Government: The Road to Peace and 
Justice?,” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 2 (2012): 220–38; Wendt, “Why a World State Is Democrati-
cally Necessary.”
64  Luis Cabrera, “On World Government: Security, Democracy, Justice,” World Government Research 
Network, June 12, 2016, http://wgresearch.org/on-world-government-security-democracy-justice/. 
65  Rolando Gaete, “Postmodernism and Human Rights: Some Insidious Questions,” Law and Critique 
2, no. 2 (1991): 168.
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global mobility rights,66 return to the nation-state as the primary provider 
of its citizens’ security? The Kantian cosmopolitan right is the right of an 
alien who comes to our country not to be treated as an enemy, so long as he 
behaves peacefully. Yet, it is not the right to become a permanent visitor. For 
this “a special charitable agreement to make him a fellow inhabitant for a 
certain period” would be required.67 Hence Kant, while advocating cosmo-
politan right as an important component of peace among people, would not 
approve the right to freely cross borders and uncontrolled migration.
Is World Government Necessary?
One can argue that we are entering now into a new era, one in which nation-
states cannot offer the protection from aggression that they once seemed to 
provide. Under new technological conditions, even large states, facing state-
sponsored or individual terrorist activities, are no longer able to guarantee 
security to their citizens and have become as vulnerable to violence as indi-
viduals in the state of nature. Hence, one can argue that just as in the logic 
of Hobbesian social contract, the fear of violent death made it necessary for 
individuals to submit to a common power, so also the changes in the forces of 
destruction make it necessary for states to enter into such a contract. The fact 
that nuclear weapons are possessed by relatively few states limits the force of 
this argument today, but it would become more powerful if nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction were to spread. Do we need a global 
authority in today’s postmodern world, in which irrationality has largely 
replaced reason and weapons of mass destruction have become cheaper and 
more readily available? 
Because of the changes in military technology, it seems indeed useful 
for security to be organized on a global scale. However, this does not mean 
that it has to take the form of a world government. The collective security 
of nations is a security system in which security becomes a concern of all 
member states, and therefore each state commits to a collective response to 
a threat posed by any state, including a member state, to peace and security. 
It has often been regarded as a principle of the United Nations and before 
that of the League of Nations. In the UN the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the Security 
Council (Art. 24, UN Charter). The Security Council is entitled to undertake 
66  Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel, eds., Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement (New 
York: Routledge, 2012).
67  Kant, Perpetual Peace, 118.
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certain measures that vary from economic sanctions to military interven-
tions, in the event that it has established a threat to peace, a breach of peace, 
or an act of aggression (Art. 39, UN Charter). In accordance with special 
agreements, it can ask member states of the UN to provide armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage (Art. 43, UN Charter). 
The logic of collective security is flawless, provided that all nations subor-
dinate whatever conflicting interests they may have to the common good 
defined in terms of the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
the collective defense of all member states.68 In practice, however, the security 
system of the UN can function only when it is supported by the major world 
powers and where there is a consensus among these major powers in the 
Security Council. As a matter of fact, for most of the history of the UN, the 
principal member states of the Security Council did not share a consensus. 
Nevertheless, what this proves is not a failure of the United Nations Organi-
zation but rather the existence of ideological and cultural differences between 
nations. There is thus much room for improvement, which can come from 
prudent diplomacy based on common interests, of which the most basic is 
global peace as opposed to total destruction. The evidence for the possibility 
of such improvement is the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of 
the ideological division between East and West that in the end led to a closer 
cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council.69 But 
this trend is unfortunately now over, and the primary reason for this is, as 
I will show, the adoption by the United States, as well by other countries, of 
unilateral actions that are contrary to the spirit of the UN. 
Article 2 of the UN Chapter says: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any other state,” but “this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.” Thus, the members of the UN system of collective security must refrain 
from taking any unilateral action without the authorization of the UN Secu-
rity Council, unless the action is related to the basic right of self-defense, and 
as Article 24 clearly says, should “confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In 
spite of this, the challenge to the UN collective security system came from 
powerful states, particularly from the United States after the September 
68  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 389.
69  Eugenia López-Jacoiste, “The UN Collective Security System and Its Relationship with Economic 
Sanctions and Human Rights,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, no. 14 (2010): 281.
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11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The school of Republican intellectuals—includ-
ing former deputy secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz and former chairman 
of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle—believed that the events of 9/11 
proved the need for the United States to assume the duties of an international 
Leviathan without much respect for the United Nations.70 They called for 
the US government to take on an imperial role and act decisively to counter 
terrorism and reinforce Western values all over the world.71 Prepared in Sep-
tember 2002, the National Security Strategy, known as the “Bush Doctrine,” 
called for pre-emptive action against hostile states and terror groups, and it 
declared that the United States would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to 
exercise its right of self-defense. The consequence of this line of thinking was 
American interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the legality of 
both of which has been questioned.72 They were justified by the United States 
as acts of self-defense, but there were no immediate and explicit threats posed 
against it by these countries and the military actions were not authorized by 
the UN Security Council. Moreover, they resulted in the devastation of both 
countries and in a large number of civilian deaths. 
As Lorenzo the Magnificent once said, “What the lord does, the many 
do after him.” The US example has led other countries to join operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and in 2011 some NATO members intervened in Libya, 
with the aim of regime change, which is illegal and contrary to the spirit of 
the UN charter.73 The military action in the form of bombing Libyan cities 
by France, the United States, and the UK was not authorized by any Security 
Council resolution. While Russia has referred to several legal arguments to 
70  Richard Perle, “Thank God for the Death of the UN,” Guardian, March 20, 2003, https://www.the-
guardian.com/politics/2003/mar/21/foreignpolicy.iraq1. For a response to this criticism of the UN, see 
W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Thank God for the UN!,” Concerned Philosophers for Peace Newsletter 
24, no. 1 (2004), http://peacephilosophy.org/16/thank-god-for-the-un-by-julian-korab-karpowicz.
71  As Rasmussen convincingly argues, following the end of the Cold War, the West has come to 
define itself in terms of globalization, the civilizing process, by which the values of democracy, market 
economy, and civil society are promoted. “The perception of the threat of terrorism fed on the West’s 
construction of its own future in terms of a powerful process of globalization. As the dark side of 
globalization, terrorism had a power equal to the bright side of globalization” (Mikkel Vedby Rasmus-
sen, “A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization,” Cooperation and Conflict: 
Journal of the Nordic Studies Association 37, no. 3 [2002]: 333).
72  Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Other 
Crimes against Humanity (London: Pluto, 2004); Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of 
Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006); Rodney P. Carlisle, Afghanistan 
War (New York: Chelsea House, 2010).
73  Fiseha Haftetsion Gebresilassie, “Collective Security at Stake? Challenges of the Current Collective 
Security System” (working paper, Feb. 2012), 9, http:/aigaforum.com/articles/collective-scecurity-at-
stake.pdf.
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justify its 2014 military intervention in and annexation of Crimea, its action 
was not authorized by the Security Council and it violated norms of inter-
national law.74 Similarly unauthorized are the military actions (bombing, 
arming opposition groups) undertaken currently by the United States, Tur-
key, France, and Israel in civil-war-torn Syria. However, the fact that, because 
of the 2002 National Security Strategy and subsequent doctrines,75 all nations 
have now become subject to military incursion by the United States, proves 
neither any abridgment of the concept of national sovereignty nor a need for a 
world government. On the contrary, by developing strategies that violate the 
accepted norms of international society based on the UN, the United States 
has affirmed its sovereignty over and against other states. It has brought 
international relations back to what is described by Kant as “savage lawless-
ness” rather than promoting lawful constraint of civilized people based on 
commonly accepted rules and norms. 
Hence, rather than dream about a world state as an instrument to build 
international peace and security, one should reverse the current trend to 
unilateralism, which is in a sense a trend toward unlawful human relations 
based on might alone, and reaffirm the spirit of lawfulness that was intro-
duced by the UN. The precondition for this is to understand that the United 
Nations Organization is potentially the best international institution for 
maintaining peace and security and for solving global problems, but its work 
depends on its members’ acceptance of its principles and of legal constraints 
that it imposes on their behavior. Perhaps the greatest problem with the idea 
of a world state and the corresponding idea of a global democracy is that 
the UN represents something imperfect and yet real, something that can be 
improved by prudent diplomacy, while the former represent wishful thinking 
that tends to diminish real solutions to today’s world problems. Supporters of 
global governance, an important component of which is the UN, argue that 
the problems of globalization do not necessitate the creation of world govern-
ment but can be solved by strengthening existing international institutions 
and organizations.76 They can be effectively dealt by the UN and the WTO, 
74  See Christian Marxsen, “The Crimea Crisis—An International Law Perspective,” Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 74, no. 2 (2014): 367–91, http://www.mpil.de/files/
pdf4/Marxsen_2014_-_the_crimea_crisis_-_an_international_law_perspective.pdf.
75  See “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Department of 
Defense, January 2012, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf; and “The 
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whose work can be supported by nongovernmental organizations, such as 
Greenpeace or Doctors Without Borders. Therefore, nations should not, as 
Wendt urges, force history along toward a world state, so as to “‘get the best 
deal’ they can in the emerging global constitution,” nor should they “spear-
head the foundation of the new international order” that would lead us to 
world government.77 Such government will not solve the current problems 
of humankind. That a world state is really needed to solve global problems—
political, economic, environmental, and demographic—and to contribute to 
human welfare and the protection of individual rights is highly question-
able. One can argue that this work can be done within the framework of the 
existing organizations, particularly by means of the global institution, which 
is the UN. It should be supported by prudent and far-sighted diplomacy, as 
well as by vigorous, prudent, and courageous states that to the best of their 
ability oppose illegal and unjust acts, and may even be willing to employ 
force in defense of the rights and the well-being of their citizens, as well as 
of international order. To provide the United Nations with sympathetic and 
robust support, to understand its idea as a federation of free states, whose 
basic goal is to maintain the security of each individual state and of other 
states in league with it, to appreciate its civilizational role in promoting law-
ful constraint against savage lawlessness, and hence to strengthen it as an 
organization rather than undermine its authority, and thus to make its work 
more effective, could help to maintain international peace and to solve many 
of our current global problems. 
The Importance of Nations
Since the UN is a league of nations, an organization of distinct sovereign 
states, and not their amalgamation in a world state, it is worth stressing, in 
conclusion, the importance of nations. While there are now many advocates 
of globalization and of postnational governance, it is important to understand 
that the nation-state is in fact the oldest political organization of humankind, 
since its tradition goes back to the Sumerian and Greek city-states, and even 
earlier to independent tribes. As John Stuart Mill convincingly argued in his 
essay On Liberty, as diverse cultural communities, European nation-states 
have been the greatest source of progress for humanity. “What has made the 
European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of 
University Press, 2007); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
77  Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” 530.
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mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists 
as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character 
and culture.”78 Mill rightly noted that in addition to the lust for power and 
wealth, which is so evident in European history, we can also find in the West 
the transforming intellectual and moral dynamics that have contributed to 
a progressive social and technological change in the world. The foundation 
of the progressive development of humankind is the remarkable diversity of 
character and culture, the condition for which is freedom. 
Continuous human progress, that is, our further moral and intellectual 
evolution, and particularly the power of intellect that, as our wonderful sci-
entific and technological achievements show, has increased in humanity as a 
whole, and which Dante thought requires peace, is worth defending. Yet its 
two basic conditions, freedom and diversity, are likely to be missing under a 
world state. Indeed, we need political and cultural diversity of nation-states 
for human creativity and progress. They cannot be turned to cosmopolitan 
entities, such as today’s European Union, in which there is confusion about 
values and consequently a loss of European heritage, or be replaced by a 
world state. Hence, the point is not to lose national diversity and freedom, but 
to peacefully build on it. One can build on fairness and lawful civility. These 
can lead us to a sense of oneness as an international community, and in the 
end produce common cultural and particularly moral values, on which any 
good political order must be founded. Therefore, the UN, particularly the UN 
Security Council, must represent universal interests of all peoples, namely, 
prosperity and freedom, not merely narrow interests of selected great powers, 
and should not be challenged by unilateral actions of its members. And there 
is a chance that such a vision of the UN will succeed because it is based on the 
correct recognition of what human beings really desire: peace and security, 
insofar as these, along with prosperity and freedom, are basic conditions of 
their development and happiness. 
Conclusion
A world state is neither necessary nor inevitable nor even desirable. As we 
have shown by considering the immense cultural differences and various 
interests that divide humankind, it will not solve the problem of violence and 
conflict. Because of its centralization and its size, and the resultant potential 
ineffectiveness, it is questionable whether it could solve global problems. 
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A real alternative to it is provided by an international society based on the 
UN and other intergovernmental organizations. A sophisticated interna-
tional society, with its diverse institutions adjusted to the emerging needs of 
humanity, creates a world order, but it is not a legal order alone. It embraces 
vigorous, wise, prudent, and courageous states that use far-sighted and 
prudent diplomacy, and sometimes even force, to oppose illegal and unjust 
acts, and support the existing world order rather than destroy it. It receives 
support from a network of nongovernmental organizations. It builds a 
strong international community and contributes to a sense of oneness of the 
whole of humanity. With adequate support, it can thus meet current global 
challenges, save us from war, and contribute to the moral and intellectual 
evolution of humankind. 
A world state is another one of humanity’s false dreams. The dream is 
that one can dispense entirely with the past and establish a society based 
on reason alone in which all human conflict and suffering will disappear 
once and for all. However, if it is artificially imposed on humankind, and not 
a result of its long development—particularly of moral improvement—ego-
ism and the struggle for power would continue within it, perhaps with even 
greater intensity, since a world state, like today’s EU, would try to impose a 
despotic, bureaucratic uniformity on humanity, and against this uniformity 
people would certainly revolt. It would be likely to become a despotism that 
brings human beings to a standstill. Even if a world state were not centralized 
but built on principles of subsidiarity, as a collective identity, it would tend 
to make everyone alike and subject to the same regulations. Even if it were 
endowed with democratic institutions, a world state, by dint of its sheer size, 
would replace freedom to participate in political life with passive obedience. 
It would lead humanity to uniformity rather than diversity, and thus it would 
prove to be an obstacle to the development of the human race. 
